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without a jury, and on January 23, 1976, the Honorable 
Gordon R. Hall did acquit the appellant of the charge 
of Theft but did find him guilty of the lesser and 
included offense of Unlawful Taking of a Vehicle. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower 
court's verdict and judgment of guilty of the charge 
of Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Arthur A. Polad parked his automobile in 
front of his home on the evening of September 28, 
1975. Mr. Polad did not see his car again until the 
following morning when he found it damaged beyond 
repair. 
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on the morning of 
September 29, 1975, police officers Phelan and Young 
discovered the automobile a few blocks from Mr. Polad's 
home. A fire hydrant was wedged underneath the car, 
and appellant was found slumped over the steering 
wheel. The appellant was unconscious due to an over-
dose of heroin he had injected into his arm. Appellant 
testified that he had no recollection as to what 
:•.: - 2 -
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happened after injecting the narcotic and had no memory 
of taking the vehicle* 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER THE FACTS IN THIS CASE, THE CRIME OF 
UNLAWFUL TAKING OF A MOTOR VEHICLE, UTAH CODE ANN. § 
41-1-109 (1953), IS A NECESSARY INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
THEFT, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (SUPP. 1975). 
If all of the elements of a given offense are 
to be found in another offense, the former is necessarily-
included in the latter. The elements of the offense of 
Unlawful Taking of a Vehicle as defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-1-109 (1953), are: 
"Any person who drives a 
vehicle, not his own, without 
consent of the owner thereof and 
with intent temporarily to deprive 
said owner of his possession of 
such vehicle without intent to 
steal the same is guilty of a mis-
demeanor. . . . " 
The elements of the crime of Theft as defined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (Supp. 1975), are: 
"A person commits theft if he 
obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof." 
-3-
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i 
Appellant contends that proof of a theft of 
operable motor vehicle does not necessarily prove an 
Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle. This contention 
is chiefly supported by the citation of State v. Ash, 
23 Utah 2d 14, 456 P.2d 154 (1969). In that case, 
a claim of error was based on a trial court's failure 
to give an instruction on the lesser included offense 
of Unlawful Taking in the prosecution of a Grand Larceny 
case. The failure to give such an instruction was held 
not to be reversible error because the jury, having been 
properly instructed on the elements of grand larceny, 
must have found the accused to have possessed an intent 
to permanently deprive the owner of his property, making 
a conviction of the lesser included offense inappropriate. 
Having disposed of the appeal on the recognized ground 
that one who is convicted of a greater offense has no 
right to complain because of errors in instructions on 
lesser offenses, the Court's subsequent discussion of the 
relationship of Grand Larceny and Unlawful Taking must be 
considered dicta. Respondent submits that as the issue 
of the inclusion of Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle in 
the crime of Theft was not squarely put to the Court in 
-4-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Ash case, the Ash decision should not control the 
result in this case. It is respondent's contention that 
establishment of the elements of the crime of Theft in 
this case would necessarily establish the elements of the 
Unlawful Taking of a Vehicle. 
The analysis of the Ash case, as well as that of 
Sandoval v. People, 176 Colo. 414, 490 P.2d 1298 (1971), 
cited by appellant, proceeds on the premise that there is 
one element of "joyriding" that is not established by the 
proof of theft, i.e., the intent to deprive the owner 
"temporarily" of his vehcle. It is reasoned that as 
Theft requires an intent to permanently deprive the owner, 
and "joyriding" requires an intent to temporarily deprive, 
and further that one cannot desire to do the same thing 
both permanently and temporarily, a proof of Theft must 
necessarily preclude a finding of joyriding. The intent 
requisite of each offense is conceived to be mutually 
exclusive and antagonistic to the other. So conceived, 
joyriding is clearly not included in Theft. The brittle 
logic of this argument, however, does not bear up well 
under careful scrutiny in the light of practical experience. 
-5-
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In order to be guilty of the crime of Unlawful 
Taking of a Vehicle, a person must "drive a vehicle, not • 
his own." The statute necessarily contemplates an 
intentional act. One who intentionally drives a car, 
not his own, must do so with an intent to deprive the 
owner of possession of such car. He may do it with the 
intent to deprive permanently, or with the intent to 
deprive temporarily, but he must form some intent to 
deprive the owner of possession. 
If the State were to establish an intentional 
Taking of a Motor Vehicle, as it did in this case, but 
was unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the intent to 
permanently deprive as required for Theft, a case of 
"joyriding" would necessarily be made out. This was 
precisely the view of the case taken by the trial judge 
as fact-finder. No one, including the appellant, was 
able to give any direct evidence as to the taking of the 
vehicle, and as a consequence, the trial judge entertained 
a reasonable doubt as to whether the appellant had formed 
the intent necessary to commit Theft. However, the 
Court entertained no doubt whatsoever that the appellant 
was guilty of "joyriding." 
-6-
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This view seems to be in accord with a more 
reasonable view of the two statutes in question. 
Respondent submits that the proper interpretation of 
the intent required for a violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-1-109 (1953), is simply a lack of intent to commit 
Theft. The language of the statute supports this view. 
The legislative purpose seems to be to define and 
punish as a criminal act the unauthorized taking of 
a vehicle, and to punish more severely those acts done 
with a larcenous intent. Adoption of appellant's 
contention, that the intent to temporarily deprive is a 
specific element of the crime rather than a negation of 
an element of theft, would create a lacuna in the 
legislative scheme. There are cases such as the instant 
case, where evidence as to intent is so sketchy as to 
make it equally probable that a defendant sought to 
deprive an owner permanently as not. In such a case, 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an intent to deprive 
permanently, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to deprive 
temporarily, would not be forthcoming, and even though 
the unauthorized taking was conclusively established, 
the act would not be punishable under law. Such a 
-7-
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construction of the statutes would be contrary to the 
express will of the legislature to construe the code 
so as to "forbid and prevent the commission of offenses." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104(1) (Supp. 1975). 
The relationship between the joyriding and 
theft statutes is analogous to the relationship between 
the statutes defining the crimes of murder in the first 
degree, murder in the second degree, and manslaughter, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202, 76-5-203, and 76-5-205 (Supp. 
1975). Murder in the second degree may be committed 
only "under circumstances not amounting to murder in the 
first degree or manslaughter," Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(Supp. 1975). No one could seriously contend that the 
above quoted phrase is an "element" of the crime of second 
degree murder that must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and as such necessarily precluding second degree 
murder being included in first degree, or manslaughter in 
second degree murder. The argument that "joyriding" is 
not included in Theft, because the former is defined as 
being done "without intent to steal" is similarly infirm. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the trial 
court committed no error in finding that, under the facts 
-8-
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of this case, the Unlawful Taking of a Vehicle was a 
lesser and included offense of Theft. 
POINT II 
EVEN ASSUMING UNLAWFUL TAKING OF A VEHICLE IS 
NOT AN INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT, THERE IS NO NEED FOR 
A REVERSAL OF THIS CASE. 
The case of People v. Powell, 46 Cal.Rptr. 417, 
236 Cal.App.2d 884 (1965), is factually similar to the 
case at bar. The defendant was charged with Grand Theft-
Auto, and was found guilty of joyriding as an included 
offense. Defendant appealed on the grounds that, under 
the California statutes, joyriding was not an included 
offense. The District Court of Appeals agreed that the 
offense was not included, but declined to reverse the 
conviction. The Court reasoned that the conviction of 
the lesser offense amounted to an informal amendment of 
the information, and that because defendant was fairly 
notified of the offense he would need to defend against, 
no prejudice resulted from the Court's failure to formally 
amend. In the instant case, the evidence clearly shows 
that defendant was guilty of at least Unlawful Taking of 
a Vehicle, and counsel was clearly prepared at trial to 
-9-
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defend his client with regards to the lesser charge. It 
would be manifestly unjust to reverse the conviction 
under these circumstances, particularly when a subsequent 
prosecution for the lesser offense would seemingly be 
barred by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1953) , as amended. 
In Farrow v. Smith, 541 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1975), this 
Court denied habeas corpus relief to a petitioner who had 
been charged with second degree murder and convicted of 
manslaughter. Petitioner had contended that manslaughter 
is not always an included offense, but this Court held 
that such a claim did not entitle petitioner to relief, 
where the conviction of the lesser offense was actually 
favorable to the petitioner. 
Respondent submits that, even if this Court were 
to find the lesser offense not to be included in this case, 
the interests of justice demand that appellant's conviction 
be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT PRONOUNCE AN ACQUITTAL OF THE 
CHARGE OF THEFT THAT WOULD PRECLUDE A FINDING THAT 
APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE. 
-10-
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As indicated in appellant's brief, the Court 
clearly announced its verdict in the case at page 61 
of the record: "The Court in this case does have a 
reasonable doubt of the intent of the defendant in this 
matter and is prepared to so rule . , « No question in 
my mind but whether he's guilty of the misdemeanor." 
(Emphasis added.) After this pronouncement of the 
verdict, counsel for the appellant inquired specifically 
if "the Court has acquitted the defendant of the greater 
offense?" (R.62). The Court replied that it had. 
In this appeal, appellant is contending that 
the Court's announcement of a verdict of guilty to the 
misdemeanor is without effect, but that the latter 
pronouncement of acquittal discharged the defendant of 
all criminal liability. It is difficult to see the 
difference between the two statements, other than the 
use of the talismanic word "acquittal" in the latter. 
This is too slim a reed to support appellant's contention. 
Even viewed in the most technical light, 
appellant's objection is not well taken. An oral opinion 
rendered by a trial court, expressing his views of the 
case which was transcribed by the court reporter, have 
-11-
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been held not to be the decision of the court. Steven 
& Wallis v. Golden Porphyry Mines Co., 81 Utah 414, 18 
P.2d 903 (1933). A judgment is complete and deemed 
entered for all purposes when the same is signed and 
filed. In Re Bundy's Estate, 121 Utah 299, 241 P.2d 462 
(1950). At the time of the pronouncement of the acquittal 
of the Theft charge, the Court had not finally ruled on 
the issue of whether Unlawful Taking was an included 
offense, and a judgment cannot properly be rendered 
until there is a finding upon every material issue. 
Thomas v. Farrell, 82 Utah 535, 26 P.2d 328 (1933). 
It is clear from the record that the Court 
announced its verdict of guilty to the lesser offense 
before announcing its acquittal on the greater, and 
that the final judgment was not rendered until after 
the argument of counsel as to whether "joyriding" 
was an included offense. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and authority, 
and in the interest of justice, respondent urges this 
Court to affirm the conviction of the appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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